In a political scene long marked by sharp ideological polarization, Tunisia has recently witnessed an unprecedented—if modest—rapprochement between secular leftist figures and Islamist leaders who, until recently, stood in opposing camps.

This convergence raises several questions: is it a temporary meeting dictated by current political circumstances, or does it reflect a deeper intellectual reassessment?

Joint initiatives
In recent days, the “Salvation Front,” which includes the “Ennahda Party” and a number of opposition parties and figures, organized an intellectual seminar attended by several individuals associated with the left.

The event sparked widespread attention and criticism from secular and leftist voices opposed to Islamists, who recalled the “historical hostility toward the Muslim Brotherhood,” pointing out the political assassinations and episodes of violence that leftists paid for during Tunisia’s post-2011 revolution period under Ennahda’s rule.

A historical rivalry
Historically, the relationship between the Tunisian left and Islamists was never one of alliance or even neutrality. Since the 1970s, the two sides were shaped by a clear struggle: the left, rooted in trade union and secular traditions, and the Islamists, who emerged in opposition to what they saw as the “Westernization of the state and society.”

Yet this is not the first time the two currents have met; similar encounters occurred before and after 2011. However, these situational overlaps often dissipated as power dynamics shifted or electoral competition resumed.

Participants at the seminar organized by the Tunisian Salvation Front. (Facebook)

The decisive turning point
Several analysts believe that the decisive shift in the relationship between Islamists and the left came with the decisions of President Kais Saied on July 25, 2021, which removed most political forces, regardless of their affiliations, from spheres of influence.

In this context, a new language has begun to emerge in political discourse, emphasizing the defense of freedoms, the independence of the judiciary, and the right to political dissent—slogans jointly adopted by leftist and Islamist forces in statements, and sometimes even in the same protest squares.

Riyad Chaibi, a member of the “Salvation Front,” sees that “some positions opposing rapprochement do not reflect differences in political judgment so much as an exclusionary mindset still trapped in ideological sorting and fascist superiority.”

In an interview with Annahar, Chaibi emphasizes that “critical historical moments are not measured by the purity of slogans, but by their ability to build a common ground for defending freedom and democracy.” He adds: “Turning intellectual differences into political rupture only serves projects that thrive on the fragmentation of opposition forces and their inability to manage internal diversity.”

He stresses that invoking old discourses is not aimed at critique or accountability, but rather at “sowing division within the democratic camp,” affirming that democracy is not built only by alliances of the similar, but by the ability of differing parties to meet around a shared minimum national agenda.

Temporary pragmatism
However, analysts caution against overinterpreting this rapprochement, as there are no strong indications of deep ideological reassessment on either side. The left has not abandoned its fundamental critique of the political Islamist project, and Islamists have not redefined their relationship with religion and the state in a way that satisfies their historical opponents. From this perspective, the convergence appears closer to a necessity-driven alliance.

Abdeljalil Bouguerra, a history professor at University of Tunis, notes that the Tunisian left has historically faced persecution, trials, and prison sentences under the independent state—from the extraordinary courts of Habib Bourguiba, which uprooted the left, to its declining presence in public life since the 1980s.

Bouguerra adds, in an interview with Annahar, that “ideological shifts in the global communist movement, particularly after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, led some leftists to view the idea of a communist alliance with Islamic movements in the Muslim world with sympathy,” similar to the stance taken by the Albanian thesis regarding “Liberation Theology” in Latin America.

He emphasizes that some Tunisian leftists adopted this approach, drawing closer to Islamists, while overlooking that Islamic movements in the Arab world, unlike Liberation Theology, often emerged with Western support. This contributed to the decline of leftist influence in Tunisia and shifted their focus toward “public freedoms” at the expense of the national question.

Bouguerra concludes that “the left has lost part of its supporters committed to the national cause and has been unable to win over Islamist supporters, who defend freedoms only when they are outside power.”

Amid differing interpretations, the question remains: can this rapprochement endure and have an impact when confronted with the first real political test?